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Abstract
Computational mechanics is a method for dis-
covering, describing and quantifying patterns,
using tools from statistical physics. It con-
structs optimal, minimal models of stochastic
processes and their underlying causal struc-
tures. These models tell us about the intrinsic
computation embedded within a process—how
it stores and transforms information. Here
we summarize the mathematics of computa-
tional mechanics, especially recent optimality
and uniqueness results. We also expound the
principles and motivations underlying compu-
tational mechanics, emphasizing its connec-
tions to the minimum description length prin-
ciple, PAC theory, and other aspects of ma-
chine learning.
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1 Introduction
All students of machine learning are familiar
with pattern recognition; in this paper we wish
to introduce a new term for a related, rela-
tively under-recognized concept, pattern dis-
covery, and a way of tackling such problems,
computational mechanics.
The term pattern discovery is meant to con-
trast with both pattern recognition and pat-
tern learning. In pattern recognition, the goal
of the system is to accurately assign inputs to
pre-set categories. In most learning systems,
the goal is to determine which of several pre-
set categorization schemes is correct. (Natu-
rally, the two tasks are closely connected (Vap-
nik 1995).) In either case, the representations
used have been, as it were, handed down from
on high, due to choices external to the recog-
nition and learning procedures.
In pattern discovery, however, the aim is
to avoid, so far as possible, such a priori
assumptions about what structures are rele-
vant. This is, of course, an ancient prob-
lem, and one which has not been ignored in
machine learning. While there are ingenious
schemes for pattern discovery via trial and er-
ror, some even informed by empirical psychol-
ogy (Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, and Thagard
1986), we believe that a more direct approach
is not only possible but also illuminates the
ideal results and the limitations of all pattern-
discovery methods.
Computational mechanics originated in
physics as a complementary approach to sta-
tistical mechanics for dealing with complex,
organized systems (Crutchfield 1994). In such
systems the “forward” approach of statis-
tical mechanics—deriving macroscopic prop-
erties from the interactions of microscopic
components—is often intractable, though data
can be had in abundance.1 Computational
1But see Chaikin and Lubensky (1995) and Cross
mechanics follows an “inverse” strategy, ex-
tending the idea of extracting “geometry from
a time series” (Packard, Crutchfield, Farmer,
and Shaw 1980). It builds the simplest model
capable of capturing the patterns in the data—
a representation of the causal structure of
the hidden process which generated the ob-
served behavior.2 In a sense that will be
made clear as we go on, this representation—
the ǫ-machine—is the unique maximally effi-
cient model of the observed data-generating
process. The basic ideas of computational
mechanics were introduced in Crutchfield and
Young (1989). Since then they have been used
to analyze dynamical systems, cellular au-
tomata, hidden Markov models, evolved spa-
tial computation, stochastic resonance, glob-
ally coupled maps, and the dripping faucet
experiment; see Shalizi and Crutchfield (1999,
Sec. 1) for references.
This paper is arranged as follows. First
we examine some conceptual issues about pat-
tern discovery and the way they are addressed
by computational mechanics. We devote the
bulk of this paper to a summary of the math-
ematical structure of computational mechan-
ics, with particular attention to optimality and
uniqueness theorems. Results are stated with-
out proof; readers will find a full treatment in
Shalizi and Crutchfield (1999). Then we dis-
cuss the ties between computational mechan-
ics and several approaches to machine learn-
ing. Finally, we close by pointing out direc-
tions for future theoretical work.
and Hohenberg (1993) for organized systems where the
“forward” approach works.
2See Feldman and Crutchfield (1998) for an exam-
ple of using both statistical and computational me-
chanics to analyze the same physical system.
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2 Conceptual Issues
Any approach to handling patterns should, we
claim, meet a number of criteria; the justifica-
tions for which are given in Shalizi and Crutch-
field (1999) in detail. It should be at once
1. Predictive, i.e., the models it produces
should allow us to predict the original
process or system we are trying to un-
derstand; and, by that token, provide a
compressed description of it;
2. Computational, showing how the process
stores, transmits, and transforms infor-
mation;
3. Calculable, analytically or by systematic
approximation;
4. Causal, telling us how instances of the
pattern are actually produced; and
5. Naturally stochastic, not merely tolerant
of noise but explicitly formulated in terms
of ensembles.
In any modeling approach, the two (related)
problems are to devise a mapping from states
of the world (or, more modestly, states of in-
puts) to states of the model, and to accurately
and precisely predict future states of the world
on the basis of the evolution of the model.
(Cf. Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, and Thagard
(1986) on “q-morphisms”.) The key idea of
computational mechanics is that the informa-
tion required to do this is actually in the data,
provided there is enough of it. In fact, if we
go about it right, the key step is getting the
mapping from data to model states right—
equivalently, the problem is to decide which
data-sets should be treated as equivalent and
how data should be partitioned. Once we have
the correct mapping of data into equivalence
classes, accurate prediction is actually fairly
simple. That the correct mapping should treat
as equivalent all data-sets which leave us in
the same degree of knowledge about the fu-
ture has a certain intuitive plausibility, but
also sounds hopelessly vague. In fact, we can
specify such a partition in a precise, opera-
tional way, show that it is the best one to use,
and determine it empirically. We call the func-
tion which induces that partition ǫ, and its
equivalence classes causal states. In fact, the
model we get from using such a partition —
the ǫ-machine — meets all the criteria stated
above. It is because the ǫ-machine shows, in a
very direct way, how information is stored in
the process, and how that stored information
is transformed by new inputs and by the pas-
sage of time, that computational mechanics is
about computation.
3 Mathematical Develop-
ment
3.1 Note on Information Theory
The bulk of the following development will be
consumed with notions and results from infor-
mation theory. We follow the standard def-
initions and notation of Cover and Thomas
(1991), to which we refer readers unfamiliar
with the theory. In particular, H [X ] is the
entropy of the discrete random variable X , in-
terpreted as the uncertainty in X , measured in
bits.3 H [X |Y ] is the entropy of X conditional
on Y , and I[X ;Y ] the mutual information be-
tween the two random variables.
3.2 Hidden Processes
We restrict ourselves to discrete-valued,
discrete-time stationary stochastic processes.
3Here, and throughout, we follow the convention of
using capital letters to denote random variables and
lower-case letters their particular values.
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(See Sec. 5.1 for discussion of these restric-
tions.) Intuitively, such processes are se-
quences of random variables Si, the values of
which are drawn from a countable set A. We
let i range over all the integers, and so get a bi-
infinite sequence
↔
S= . . . S−1S0S1 . . .. In fact,
we define a process in terms of the distribution
of such sequences.
Given that
↔
S is well-defined, there are prob-
ability distributions for sequences of every
finite length. Let
→
S
L
t be the sequence of
St, St+1, . . . , St+L−1 of L random variables be-
ginning at St.
→
S
0
t≡ λ, the null sequence. Like-
wise,
←
S
L
t denotes the sequence of L random
variables going up to St, but not including it:
←
S
L
t =
→
S
L
t−L. Both
→
S
L
t and
←
S
L
t take values from
sL ∈ AL. Similarly,
→
S t and
←
S t are the semi-
infinite sequences starting from and stopping
at t and taking values
→
s and
←
s , respectively.
Requiring the process Si to be stationary
means that
P(
→
S
L
t = s
L) = P(
→
S
L
0= s
L) , (1)
for all t ∈ Z, L ∈ Z+, and all sL ∈ AL.
(A stationary process is one that is time-
translation invariant.) Consequently, P(
→
S t=
→
s
) = P(
→
S 0=
→
s ) and P(
←
S t=
←
s ) = P(
←
S0=
←
s ),
and so the subscripts may be dropped.
3.3 Effective States
Our goal is to predict all or part of
→
S using
some function of some part of
←
S . We begin by
taking the set
←
S of all pasts and partitioning
it into mutually exclusive and jointly compre-
hensive subsets. That is, we make a classR of
subsets of pasts. (See Fig. 1.) Each ρ ∈R will
be called a state or an effective state. When
the current history
←
s is included in the set ρ,
we will say the process is in state ρ. Thus,
1R
3R
2R
S
←
4R
Figure 1: A schematic picture of a partition
of the set
←
S of all histories into some class
of effective states: R = {Ri : i = 1, 2, 3, 4}.
Note that the Ri need not form compact sets;
we simply draw them that way for clarity. One
should have in mind Cantor sets or other more
pathological structures.
there is a function from histories to effective
states:
η :
←
S 7→R . (2)
An individual history
←
s ∈
←
S maps to a specific
state ρ ∈ R; the random variable
←
S for the
past maps to the random variable R for the
effective states.
Any function defined on
←
S will serve to par-
tition that set: we just assign to the same ρ
all the histories
←
s on which the function takes
the same value. (Similarly, any equivalence re-
lation on
←
S partitions it.) Each effective state
has a well-defined conditional distribution of
futures, though not necessarily a unique one.
Specifying the effective state thus amounts to
making a prediction about the process’s fu-
ture. In this way, the framework formally in-
corporates traditional methods of time-series
analysis.
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3.4 Patterns in Ensembles
It will be convenient to have a way of talking
about the uncertainty of the future. We do
not want to use H [
→
S ], since that is infinite in
general. Instead, we will work with H [
→
S
L
],
the uncertainty of the next L symbols, treated
as a function of L.
Definition 1 (Capturing a Pattern) R
captures a pattern iff there exists an L such
that
H [
→
S
L
|R] < LH [S] . (3)
R captures a pattern when it tells us some-
thing about how the distinguishable parts of a
process affect each other: R exhibits their de-
pendence. (We also speak of η as capturing a
pattern.) The smaller H [
→
S
L
|R], the stronger
the pattern captured by R. Our first result
bounds how strongly R can capture a pro-
cess’s pattern.
Lemma 1 For all R and for all L ∈ Z+,
H [
→
S
L
|R] ≥ H [
→
S
L
|
←
S ] . (4)
3.5 Minimality and Prediction
Let’s invoke Occam’s Razor: “It is vain to do
with more what can be done with less”. To use
the razor, we have to fix what is to be “done”
and what “more” and “less” mean. The job
we want done is accurate prediction; i.e., to re-
duce the conditional entropies H [
→
S
L
|R] as far
as possible, down to the bound set by Lemma
1. But we want to do this as simply as pos-
sible, with as few resources as possible. To
meet both constraints—minimal uncertainty
and minimal resources—we will need a mea-
sure of the second. Since P(
←
S=
←
s ) is well de-
fined, it induces a probability distribution on
the η-states, and we can set up the following
measure of resources.
Definition 2 (Complexity of State
Classes) The statistical complexity of a class
R of states is
Cµ(R) ≡ H [R] (5)
= −
∑
ρ∈R
P(R = ρ) log2 P(R = ρ) ,
when the sum converges to a finite value.
Cµ(R) is the average uncertainty in the pro-
cess’s current state R. This is the same as
the average amount of memory (in bits) that
the process appears to retain about the past,
given the chosen state class R. We wish to
do with as little of this memory as possible.
Our objective, then, is to find a state class
which minimizes Cµ, subject to the constraint
of maximally accurate prediction.
3.6 Causal States
Definition 3 (A Process’s Causal States)
The causal states of a process are the members
of the range of the function ǫ :
←
S 7→ 2
←
S—the
power set of
←
S:
ǫ(
←
s ) ≡
{
←
s
′
|P(
→
S=
→
s |
←
S=
←
s ) = P(
→
S=
→
s |
←
S=
←
s
′
),
for all
→
s∈
→
S,
←
s
′
∈
←
S} , (6)
that maps from histories to classes of his-
tories. We write the ith causal state as Si
and the set of all causal states as S; the cor-
responding random variable is denoted S and
its realization σ.
The cardinality of S is unrestricted. S can
be finite, countably infinite, a continuum, a
Cantor set, or something stranger still.4
4Examples of all of these are given in Crutchfield
(1994) and Upper (1997).
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We could equally well define an equivalence
relation ∼ǫ such that two histories are equiv-
alent iff they have the same conditional dis-
tribution of futures, and define causal states
as the equivalence classes of ∼ǫ. (In fact, this
was the original approach of Crutchfield and
Young (1989).) Either way, we break
←
S into
parts that leave us in different conditions of
ignorance about the future.
Each causal state Si has a conditional distri-
bution of futures, P(
→
S |Si). It follows directly
from Def. 3 that no two states have the same
distribution of futures; this is not true of ef-
fective states in general. Another immediate
consequence of that definition is that
P(
→
S=
→
s |S = ǫ(
←
s )) = P(
→
S=
→
s |
←
S=
←
s ). (7)
Again, this is not generally true of effective
states.
3.7 Causal State-to-State Tran-
sitions
The causal state at any given time and the
next value of the observed process together de-
termine a new causal state (Lemma 2 below,
which doesn’t rely on the following). Thus,
there is a natural relation of succession among
the causal states.
Definition 4 (Causal Transitions) The la-
beled transition probability T
(s)
ij is the probabil-
ity of making the transition from state Si to
state Sj while emitting the symbol s ∈ A:
T
(s)
ij ≡ P(S
′ = Sj ,
→
S
1
= s|S = Si) , (8)
where S is the current causal state and S ′ its
successor on emitting s. We denote the set
{T
(s)
ij : s ∈ A} by T.
3.8 ǫ-Machines
Definition 5 (An ǫ-Machine Defined)
The ǫ-machine of a process is the ordered pair
{ǫ,T}, where ǫ is the causal state function
and T is set of the transition matrices for the
states defined by ǫ.
Lemma 2 (ǫ-Machines Are Determinis-
tic) For each Si and s ∈ A, T
(s)
ij > 0 only for
that Sj for which ǫ(
←
ss) = Sj iff ǫ(
←
s ) = Si, for
all pasts
←
s .
“Deterministic” is meant in the sense of
automata-theory, not dynamics.
Lemma 3 (Causal States Are Indepen-
dent) The probability distributions over causal
states at different times are conditionally inde-
pendent.
This indicates that the causal states, con-
sidered as a process, define a kind of Markov
chain. We say “kind of” since the class of
ǫ-machines is substantially richer than the
one normally associated with Markov chains
(Crutchfield 1994; Upper 1997).
Definition 6 (ǫ-Machine Reconstruction)
ǫ-Machine reconstruction is any procedure that
given a process P(
↔
S ), or an approximation of
P(
↔
S ), produces the process’s ǫ-machine {ǫ,T}.
Given a mathematical description of a pro-
cess, one can often calculate analytically its
ǫ-machine. (For example, see the computa-
tional mechanics analysis of statistical me-
chanical spin systems in Feldman and Crutch-
field (1998).) There are also algorithms that
reconstruct ǫ-machines from empirical esti-
mates of P(
↔
S ). Those used in Crutchfield
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(1994), Crutchfield and Young (1989), Han-
son (1993), and Perry and Binder (1999), op-
erate in batch mode, taking the raw data as
a whole and producing the ǫ-machine. Others
could work on-line, taking in individual mea-
surements and re-estimating the set of causal
states and their transition probabilities.
3.9 Optimalities and Uniqueness
Theorem 1 (Causal States are Maxi-
mally Prescient) For all R and all L ∈ Z+,
H [
→
S
L
|R] ≥ H [
→
S
L
|S] = H [
→
S
L
|
←
S ] . (9)
Causal states are as good at predicting the
future—are as prescient—as complete histo-
ries. Since the causal states can be system-
atically approximated, we have shown that
the upper bound on the strength of patterns
(Def. 1 and Lemma 1) can in fact be reached.
All subsequent results concern rival states
that are as prescient as the causal states. We
call these prescient rivals and denote a class of
them Rˆ.
Definition 7 (Prescient Rivals) Prescient
rivals Rˆ are states that are as predictive as
the causal states; viz., for all L ∈ Z+,
H [
→
S
L
|Rˆ] = H [
→
S
L
|S] . (10)
Lemma 4 (Refinement Lemma) For all
prescient rivals Rˆ and for each ρˆ ∈ Rˆ, there
is a σ ∈ S and a measure-0 subset ρˆ0 ⊂ ρˆ,
possibly empty, such that ρˆ \ ρˆ0 ⊆ σ, where \
is set subtraction.
The lemma becomes more intuitive if we ig-
nore for a moment the measure-0 set ρˆ0 of his-
tories. It then says that any alternative parti-
tion Rˆ that is as prescient as the causal states
1R 3R
2R
1S
4S
3S 5
S
2S 6S
S
← 4R
Figure 2: An alternative class R of states
(delineated by dashed lines) that partition
←
S
overlaid on the causal states S (solid lines).
Here, for example, S2 contains parts of R1,
R2, R3 and R4. Note again that the Ri
need not be compact nor simply connected,
as drawn.
must be a refinement of the causal-state par-
tition. That is, each Rˆi must be a (possibly
improper) subset of some Sj . Otherwise, at
least one Rˆi would contain parts of at least two
causal states. Therefore, using Rˆi to predict
the future observables would lead to more un-
certainty about
→
S than using the causal states.
(Compare Fig. 3 with Fig. 2.) Because the
histories in ρˆ0 have zero probability, treating
them the “wrong” way makes no discernible
difference to predictions.
Theorem 2 (Causal States Are Minimal)
For all prescient rivals Rˆ,
Cµ(Rˆ) ≥ Cµ(S) . (11)
If we were trying to predict, not the whole
of
→
S but some limited piece
→
S
L
, the causal
7
3R
∧
4R
∧
5R
∧
6R
∧
7R
∧
8R
∧
1R
∧
9R
∧
10R
∧
2R
∧
1S
4S
3S
5S
2S
6S
S
←
11R
∧
Figure 3: A prescient rival partition Rˆ must
be a refinement of the causal-state partition
almost everywhere. Almost all of each Rˆi must
lie within some Sj ; the exceptions, if any, are a
set of histories of measure 0. Here for instance
S2 contains the positive-measure parts of Rˆ3,
Rˆ4, and Rˆ5. One of these rival states, say Rˆ3,
could have member-histories in any or all of
the other causal states, if the total measure of
these exceptional histories is zero.
states might not be the simplest ones with full
predictive power. For any value of L, how-
ever, the states constructed by analogy to the
causal states—the “truncated causal states”—
have maximal prescience and minimal Cµ.
The minimality theorem licenses the follow-
ing definition.
Definition 8 (Statistical Complexity of
a Process) The statistical complexity Cµ(O)
of a process O is that of its causal states:
Cµ(O) ≡ Cµ(S).
Theorem 3 (Causal States Are Unique)
For all prescient rivals Rˆ, if Cµ(Rˆ) = Cµ(S),
then there exists an invertible function between
Rˆ and S that almost always preserves equiv-
alence of state: Rˆ and η are the same as S
and ǫ, respectively, except on a set of histories
of measure 0.
The remarks on Lemma 4 also apply to the
ineliminable but immaterial measure-0 caveat
here.
Theorem 4 (ǫ-Machines Are Minimally
Stochastic) For all prescient rivals Rˆ,
H [Rˆ′|Rˆ] ≥ H [S ′|S] , (12)
where S ′ and Rˆ′ are the next causal state of
the process and the next η-state, respectively.
Finally, we relate Cµ to an information the-
oretic quantity that is often used to measure
complexity.
Definition 9 (Excess Entropy) The
excess entropy E of a process is the mutual
information between its semi-infinite past and
its semi-infinite future:
E ≡ I[
→
S ;
←
S ] . (13)
Excess entropy is regularly re-introduced
into the complexity-measure literature, as
“predictive information”, “stored informa-
tion”, “effective measure complexity”, and so
on (Shalizi and Crutchfield 1999, Sec. VI). As
these names indicate, it is tempting to see E as
the amount of information stored in a process
(which accounts for its popularity). Accord-
ing to the following theorem this temptation
should be resisted.
Theorem 5 The statistical complexity Cµ
bounds the excess entropy E:
E ≤ Cµ(S) , (14)
with equality iff H [S|
→
S ] = 0.
E is thus only a lower bound on the true
amount of information stored in the process,
namely Cµ(S).
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4 Relations to Other Fields
4.1 Computational and Statisti-
cal Learning Theory
The goal of computational learning theory
(Kearns and Vazirani 1994; Vapnik 1995) is to
identify algorithms that quickly, reliably, and
simply lead to good representations of a tar-
get concept, usually taken to be a dichotomy
of a feature or input space. Particular atten-
tion is paid to “probably approximately cor-
rect” (PAC) procedures (Valiant 1984): those
having a high probability of finding a close
match to the target concept among members
of a fixed representation class. The key word
here is “fixed”. While taking the representa-
tion class as a given is in line with implicit
assumptions in most of mathematical statis-
tics, it seems dubious when analyzing learn-
ing in the real world (Crutchfield 1994; Boden
1994).
In any case, such an assumption is clearly
inappropriate if our goal is pattern discovery,
and it was not made in the preceding devel-
opment. While we plan to make every possi-
ble use of the results of computational learn-
ing theory in ǫ-machine reconstruction, we feel
this theory is more properly a part of statisti-
cal inference and, particularly, of algorithmic
parameter estimation, than of pattern discov-
ery per se.
4.2 Formal Language Theory
and Grammatical Inference
It is well known that formal languages can
be classified into a hierarchy, the higher lev-
els of which have strictly greater expressive
power. The denizens of the lowest level of the
hierarchy, the regular languages, correspond
to finite-state machines and to hidden Markov
models of finite dimension. In such cases, rel-
atives of our minimality and uniqueness the-
orems are well known, and the construction
of causal states is analogous to Nerode equiv-
alence classing (Hopcroft and Ullman 1979).
Our theorems, however, are not restricted to
this setting.
The problem of learning a language from ob-
servational data has been extensively studied
by linguists and computer scientists. Unfor-
tunately, good learning techniques exist only
for the two lowest classes in the hierarchy, the
regular and the context-free languages. (For a
good account of these procedures see Charniak
(1993).) Adapting this work to the reconstruc-
tion of ǫ-machines should be a useful area for
future research.
4.3 The Minimum Description-
Length Principle
Rissanen’s minimum description-
length (MDL) principle, best presented in his
book (1989), is a way of picking the most con-
cise generative model out of a chosen family of
models that are all statistically consistent with
given data. The MDL approach starts from
Shannon’s results on the connection between
probability distributions and codes (Shannon
and Weaver 1963).
Suppose we choose a classM of models and
are given data set x. The MDL principle tells
us to use the model M ∈ M that minimizes
the sum of the length of the description of x
given M, plus the length of description of M
givenM. The description length of x is taken
to be − logP(x|M). The description length of
M may be regarded as either given by some
coding scheme or, equivalently, by some dis-
tribution over the members of M.
Though the MDL principle was one of the
inspirations of computational mechanics, our
approach to pattern discovery does not fit
within Rissanen’s framework. To mention only
the most basic differences: We have no fixed
class of modelsM; we do not use encodings of
9
rival models or prior distributions over them;
and Cµ(R) is not a description length.
4.4 Connectionist Models
Neural networks engaged in unsupervised
learning (Becker 1991) are often effectively do-
ing pattern discovery. Certainly Hebb (1949)
had this aim in mind when proposing his learn-
ing rule. While such networks certainly can
discover regularities and covariations, they of-
ten represent them in ways baffling to humans.
ǫ-Machines present the structures discovered
by reconstruction in a clear and distinct way,
but the learning dynamics are not (currently)
as well understood as those of neural networks;
see Sec. 5.2 below.
5 Concluding Remarks
5.1 Limitations of the Current
Results
We made some restrictive assumptions in our
development above. Here we mention them in
order of increasing severity and consider what
may be done to lift them.
1. We know exact joint probabilities over se-
quence blocks of all lengths for a process. The
cure for this is ǫ-machine reconstruction and
in the next subsection we sketch work (under-
way) on a statistical theory of reconstruction.
2. The observed process takes on discrete
values. This can probably be addressed with
only a modest cost in increased mathematical
subtlety, since the information-theoretic quan-
tities we have used also exist for continuous
variables. Many of our results appear to carry
over to the continuous setting.
3. The process is discrete in time. This
looks similarly solvable, since continuous-time
stochastic process theory is moderately well
developed. It may involve sophisticated prob-
ability theory or functional analysis, however.
4. The process is a pure time series; e.g.,
without spatial extent. There are already tricks
to make spatially extended systems look like
time series. Basically, one looks at all the
paths through space-time, treating each one as
if it were a time series. While this works well
for data compression (Lempel and Ziv 1986),
it may not be satisfactory for capturing struc-
ture (Feldman 1998).
5. The process is stationary. It’s unclear
how best to relax the assumption of station-
arity. There are several straightforward ways
of doing so, but it is unclear how much sub-
stantive content these extensions have. In
any case, a systematic classification of non-
stationary processes is (at best) in its infant
stages.
5.2 Directions for Future Work
Two broad avenues for research present them-
selves.
First, we have the mathematics of ǫ-
machines themselves. Assumption-lifting ex-
tensions have just been mentioned but there
are many other ways to go. One which is espe-
cially interesting in the machine-learning con-
text is the trade-off between prescience and
complexity. For a given process there is a
sequence of optimal machines connecting the
one-state, zero-complexity machine with mini-
mal prescience to the ǫ-machine. Each step on
the path is the minimal machine for a certain
degree of prescience; it would be very inter-
esting to know what, if anything, we can say
in general about the shape of this “prediction
frontier”.
Second, there is ǫ-machine reconstruction.
As we remarked (p. 6), there are already sev-
eral algorithms for reconstructing machines
from data. What we need is knowledge of the
error statistics (Mayo 1996) of different recon-
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struction procedures, of the kinds of mistakes
they make and the probabilities with which
they make them. Ideally, we want to find “con-
fidence regions” for the products of reconstruc-
tion: calculating the probabilities of different
degrees of reconstruction error for a given vol-
ume of data or the amount of data needed to
be confident of a fixed bound on the error. An
analytical theory has been developed for the
expected error in reconstructing certain kinds
of processes (Crutchfield and Douglas 1999).
The results are encouraging enough that work
is underway on a general theory of statistical
inference for ǫ-machines—a theory analogous
to what already exists in computational learn-
ing theory and grammatical inference.
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